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Internationalising to create Firm Specific Advantages: 
Leapfrogging strategies of U.S. Pharmaceutical firms in the 1930s and 1940s & Indian 
Pharmaceutical firms in the 1990s and 2000s. 
 
The global pharmaceuticals industry is more dependent upon commercializing new 
scientific innovations than any other sector and has grown in a non-linear fashion, 
following the cycles of particular paths of scientific discovery. The early alkaloids (plant-
based therapies) of the late nineteenth century gave rise to many products and companies of 
varying levels of scientific veracity and efficacy. From the 1890s scientific discoveries in 
antitoxins and sera enabled new firms to emerge that acquired capabilities here. By the 
1920s new therapies were emerging through synthetic chemistry, but the truly 
revolutionary change came in the 1930s and 1940s, when the early sulphas and anti-
infectives first emerged. Antibiotics required new science and different manufacturing 
techniques, enabling a window of opportunity for new entrants to grow and acquire market 
share rapidly. Pfizer, for example, the world’s leading producer of penicillin from the end 
of World War 2 through to the 1960s, had not even had any presence in pharmaceuticals 
before 1942. 
 
In more recent times, the potential of biotechnology to produce novel drugs and therapies 
also represents a Kuhnian shift from one paradigm of pharmaceuticals production to a new 
one, allowing new entrants into global pharmaceuticals. Combined with advances in 
information technology which have allowed the use of genomic databases and simulated 
trial and error stages (Gambardella 1989), the use of rDNA methods to discover new 
remedies and therapies has fundamentally shifted the scientific base of pharmaceutical 
production from a knowledge of chemistry alone to a more nuanced understanding of the 
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interaction between chemistry and biology.  The emergence of genomics has thus once 
again opened a new technological trajectory allowing new entrants the opportunity to 
challenge the market shares of established firms, as was the case with antibiotics in the 
1940s.  A small number of Indian pharmaceuticals firms with existing capabilities in the 
bulk manufacturing of generic drugs have attempted to upgrade their research capabilities 
in attempts to discover and commercialise New Chemical Entities (NCEs) and so compete 
directly with the world’s major pharmaceuticals firms for the most profitable segment of 
the sector (Athreye, Kale and Ramani, 2008). Such aggressive attempts by these few firms 
have attracted considerable attention although the jury is still out on whether they will 
register any success. 
 
The role of technological discontinuities in creative destruction and the emergence of new 
leaders in the pharmaceutical sector is well researched and documented, however little 
attention has hitherto focussed on the critical issue of if and how internationalisation can 
help firms to achieve leadership during moments of technological discontinuity.  Exploiting 
the two crucial moments of technological discontinuity in the pharmaceutical sector (viz. 
the antibiotics revolution and the emerging potential of biotechnology in new drug 
discovery), this paper seeks to identify the leapfrogging strategies used by U.S. 
pharmaceuticals firms in the late 1930s and 1940s to overcome their disadvantages in the 
early years of the antibiotics era and then systematically compare and contrast these to the 
leapfrogging strategies used by Indian firms since 1990.  Our focus is on identifying which 
internationalisation strategies have played a role and how they were used for the building 
of technological capability and lasting competitive advantages by US firms in the 1930s 
and Indian firms in the 1990s.  
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The remainder of the paper is organised in the following way:  Section 1 briefly reviews 
the literature technological discontinuity and role of internationalisation in technological 
leapfrogging; Section 2 sets out the similarities and differences in the market conditions of 
the pharmaceutical industry in the 1930s and in the 1990s.  These sections set the stage for 
a more detailed comparison of the patterns of internationalisation and knowledge 
acquisition among U.S. firms in the late 1930s and 1940s and Indian firms in the 1990s in 
sections 3 and 4.  Section 5 concludes with some implications for host economies of such 
internationalisation behaviour. 
 
1.  Technological discontinuity, Internationalisation and Technological leapfrogging 
 
The idea that technological discontinuities could be moments when new entrepreneurs 
could take over leadership in markets is at the heart of the Schumpeterian ‘creative 
destruction’ thesis.  There is some debate on whether new firms are the harbingers of 
radical technologies (the original Schumpeterian thesis challenged by Arrow 1975) or 
simply better positioned to exploit new technologies, as the innovation management 
literature suggests (Tushman and Andersen, 1986).  The reasoning here is that radical 
innovations require managerial, organisational and marketing competences, which take 
time to build. Incumbent firms would thus, prefer to adopt innovations that enhance 
existing competences rather than radical innovations, which are likely to need new 
competences or destroy the value from existing ones.  In contrast, new entrants would have 
had no such baggage from the past and were more likely to adopt radical technologies.  
Other work in this tradition has qualified the early optimism.  Market knowledge 
(Abernathy and Clark, 1985), the important role of system architectures (Henderson and 
Clark 1990) and the role played by the ownership of complementary assets (Teece, 1985) –
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have all been identified as factors favouring incumbent firms in the adoption of radically 
new technologies.  
 
The idea that laggard nations could better exploit new technologies from around the world 
during periods of technological discontinuity was first suggested in a prescient paper by 
Soete (1985).  In the context of the newly emerging microelectronics revolution, he argued 
that globalisation permitted newly industrialising countries to ‘leapfrog’ into newer 
technologies and higher rates of growth.  The idea is that globalisation presents firms in a 
technologically laggard nation with the opportunity to gain competitive advantage over 
incumbent firms in technologically dominant nations through the rapid adoption of superior 
new technologies.  The East Asian success story in semiconductors and microelectronics 
certainly appeared to confirm his intuition, though studies on successful leapfrogging in 
East Asia (Kim 1997, Hobday 1995, Amsden 1989) also highlighted the role of domestic 
absorptive capacity and firm capabilities.  However, until relatively recently, the East Asian 
success was thought to rest on one form of internationalisation viz. large export markets 
which provided the production scale on the basis of which domestic firms built their 
capabilities.  
 
More recent work has significantly altered our perception of the role of internationalisation 
in the leapfrogging strategies of Korean firms.  Sachwald (2001) used empirical tests and 
case studies, to show that Korean groups had invested in developed countries not only to 
jump over trade barriers, but also to source advanced technology and marketing capabilities 
throughout the 1990s. Moreover, their ambitious strategies were often stimulated by 
oligopolistic rivalry among the chaebols. Matthews (2002) in his book Dragon 
Multinationals argues that firms from East Asia invested abroad to make linkages, leverage 
 9  
   
capabilities and also learn from their overseas investments.  This last aspect was not new of 
course since at least two empirical studies by Cantwell (1995) and  Kummermele (1999) 
had already argued that in a globalised world where technological spillovers of any kind 
were present,  firms would go abroad not only to exploit their firm specific assets but also 
to augment their (technological) asset base.  However, their work was based on empirical 
data from developed country MNEs that were thought to possess sufficient resources 
(managerial and financial) to manage such complex international operations.   
 
Korean firms without too many firm specific advantages to start with, nevertheless went 
abroad quite early in their life to countries that were in cultural terms very ‘distant’ from 
them. An influential strand of International Business theory since the 1970s has seen the 
possession of some kind of proprietary firm assets (brands, trademarks, patents etc.) as 
necessary condition for going abroad since going abroad entails various kinds of 
organisational and transactional costs, costs that increase as the cultural or psychic distance 
grows.  Yet Korean firms had embraced such large risks and further their international 
investments had been instrumental in creating the global competitiveness and brands of the 
firms that did go abroad.   This suggested the emergence of a different kind of firm with a 
global mindset - which used both global and local resources to develop their competitive 
strengths.   
 
Despite the important role played by internationalisation strategies in the development of 
Korean firms, the literature on leapfrogging does not accord a large role to the study of 
internationalisation in the successful leapfrogging by laggard firms.  A recent review of the 
empirical literature on ICTs and the possibilities for leapfrogging by developing countries 
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by Steinmueller (2001) identifies four pre-requisites for successful leapfrogging by 
developing country firms:  
1. Developing absorptive capacity in the technology which enables the firm to use and 
embed the technology in innovative products and services,  
2. Access to know-how and equipment relating to the new technology 
3. The need for complementary capabilities in other aspects of systemic integration of 
ICT based modules- this might mean developing capabilities in modular interfaces and 
adopting product and quality standards 
4. Achieving downstream integration capabilities such as in product design, marketing 
ability and the ability to create “own brands”.   
 
Although developed in the context of the ICT sector this framework presents a coherent 
way of thinking about the requirements for technological leapfrogging more generally.  It 
incorporates the lessons learnt from the East Asian experiences and also reflects the two 
properties that Teece (1985) had predicted would be important to explain who would profit 
the most from new innovations, viz. the influence of appropriability regimes and the 
possession of complementary assets. The first two preconditions define the important 
influences on the appropriability regimes facing the innovator.  The ability to use and 
embed the new technology in complex products and processes and the ease with which the 
innovator could access new developments in the technology were absolutely crucial to 
defining how inimitable the technological product would be.  The last two factors highlight 
the importance of complementary knowledge and resources in being able to effectively 
commercialise the products of the new technology.   
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It is worth noting that internationalisation strategies, in the form of strategic alliances, 
international licensing or international investments, can help firms to achieve preconditions 
2, 3, and 4.  Thus in the context of strong IPR international licensing and alliances are 
alternative methods to access technological know-how and both downstream and 
complementary assets such as distribution networks, regulatory knowledge can be usefully 
acquired by setting up own subsidiaries or by acquiring other firms that have  regulatory 
approval and established market shares. 
 
The framework proposed by Steinmueller (2001) only needs small modifications in order 
to apply it to a study of leapfrogging in the pharmaceutical sector.  Precondition 2 is quite 
different in the case of pharmaceuticals when compared to the ICT sector because the 
widespread use of defensive patenting may have restricted the scope of technological 
know-how accessible to firms through licensing.1  However, as innovation in 
pharmaceuticals has become more complex and inter-disciplinary, it has over time created 
more elaborate divisions of labour between the various actors involved in it.  Regulatory 
authorities and quality standards play an important role in coordinating aspects of the 
systemic integration.    
 
2. The historical similarities: U.S. Pharmaceuticals during the antibiotics revolution 
and India in the biotechnology era 
 
The introduction of antibiotics totally transformed the world pharmaceuticals sector. Before 
antibiotics the world’s leading source for scientific innovation was not the United States 
but Germany. German scientists were the pioneers of modern chemistry and the leaders in 
synthetic chemistry. In the late 1930s it was German industry that was the father of the 
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modern sulphas (Bud 2007). Indeed U.S. scientific capabilities ranked behind Swiss, 
French and British as well as German in pharmaceuticals research until the 1940s. Even 
then the leading U.S. scientists remained in public institutes and universities, not in 
commercial research organisations (Swann 1988). Research capabilities among U.S. 
pharmaceuticals firms in the mid-1930s were very scarce indeed. Eli Lilly and Merck were 
the sector’s two pioneers of building U.S. industrial research capabilities in the 1930s, but 
together they employed less than 500 scientists researching ethical pharmaceuticals by 
1935, far fewer than the leading German producers. The U.S. pharmaceuticals industry was 
dominated by heavily advertised, branded consumer products, with low scientific content. 
But the German firms failed to develop antibiotics. 
 
By the early 1950s there were around fifteen U.S. firms that had rapidly gained leading 
positions in the global pharmaceuticals industry on the back of enormous investments in 
R&D and developing new, patented antibiotics and derivative products. These firms then 
went on to occupy significant positions in the global pharmaceuticals sector through to the 
1960s. It represents a classic case of technological leapfrogging and much of the credit for 
this remarkable transformation of the U.S. pharmaceuticals industry is usually given to the 
U.S. wartime government for subsidizing the crash programme to build capabilities in mass 
producing penicillin for military purposes - as well as for destroying the German 
competition – although as we shall see, internationalisation strategies were also key (Temin 
1979, Bud 2007). 
 
Like the U.S. firms in the 1930s, Indian firms in the early 1990s held very few 
pharmaceutical patents.  Most of the patents in this sector were held by European and 
American firms and most genomics patents were held by U.S. firms. Indian pharmaceutical 
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R&D investments in the 1980s and even 1990s had been mostly in reverse engineering and 
large scale manufacture of chemical drugs - the old rather than the new technology in 
pharmaceuticals.  The role of Indian government policies (such as weak IPR laws that 
recognised only process patents) is widely lauded as having been chiefly responsible for the 
emergence of manufacturing and reverse engineering capability among a small subset of 
Indian firms, that are leading firms in the manufacture of generics today. (Lanjouw 1998, 
Ramani and Venkataramani, 2001, Gehl-Sampat, 2006).   
 
Another similarity resides in the creation of an international market for pharmaceutical 
products created mainly by the actions of national governments.  The antibiotics revolution 
transformed the scale of the potential international market, leading to a global industry for 
the first time, dominated by the leading multinational producers. The spur to the U.S. 
development was the wartime needs to combat infection among the allied forces. But after 
1945 many countries tried to develop their own pharmaceutical sectors. There was a two 
way division of the world market -- between advanced economies, where producers were 
regulated on quality and governed by the requirements of health systems, and the 
developing world, where the overwhelming regulation on pharmaceutical producers was in 
terms of prices.   
 
As the costs of drugs for public health systems in the West became larger and larger from 
the mid 1980s, something similar to the war-time antibiotics demand took place once again.  
Cheaper drugs were sought to be ‘procured’ by US and European governments in order to 
bring down medical costs for the population, most of which regards access to health 
services as a fundamental right to be provided by the State. Since generic drugs sell at 
roughly 1/3 the price of a branded drug, one way to bring down costs of the medical bill to 
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the public sector was through generics substitution.  In 2002 generics held 47% by volume 
of the prescription drug market in the USA, more than twice the 22% share of 1985 (Maris 
et al, 2003; WTO 1999).  Laws were passed by national governments2 to encourage the 
manufacture of generics and to bring down the costs of new entry into this market, which 
was also fast becoming a highly internationalised market.  Many Indian firms today are 
funding their acquisition of skills in biotechnology and new drug discovery from their 
strong positions in the generics market. 
 
It is this similarity in the starting points and in the potential opportunities facing the two 
cases that constitutes the rationale for our comparison of US firms in the 1930s with Indian 
firms from the 1990s.  Of course, no two periods of history are completely alike and in the 
sections that follow we outline the two histories.  Section 5 then discusses the similarities 
and differences in the role that internationalisation played in the leapfrogging strategies 
adopted by Indian and US firms. 
 
3. Origins and Development of the U.S. Pharmaceuticals industry. 
 
The nascent U.S. pharmaceuticals sector from the 1900s to World War One consisted of 
firms that were either wholesalers or distributors of German imported fine chemicals and 
drugs (Sharp and Dohme and Squibb, for instance), or subsidiaries of German parents 
(Merck, Schering and several others), or had begun to develop their own competing 
products, like Mulford and Parke Davis in antitoxins and sera, for example.3  
 
But the vast majority of firms producing medicines in the U.S. focused on non-prescription 
products, typically building market share through aggressive marketing strategies, intensive 
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advertising, and large sales forces that promoted these branded over-the-counter (OTC) 
products to the nation’s pharmacists and other retailers. These producers of laxatives, 
‘healing’ creams, antiseptics, sedatives, analgesics, and other medicinal products of varying 
degrees of efficacy, also produced and sold a variety of toilet goods, including toothpaste, 
shaving cream, cosmetics and hair lotion. In 1929 the wholesale value of ethical 
prescription medicines sold in the U.S. was just over $55 million. This was dwarfed by the 
$149 million sales of OTC products, which in turn was much smaller than the $300 million 
in branded toilet goods and cosmetics (Church and Tansey, 2007, p.411). Ethical 
pharmaceuticals was only a little over one-tenth the size of the market for OTC medicinal 
products and toilet goods.4 The dominant group of firms in the U.S. pharmaceuticals 
industry – focusing on OTC and toilet goods - actually bore greater resemblance to Heinz 
or Proctor and Gamble than to the research-led pharmaceuticals sector of the 1950s and 
1960s, with their competitive advantage derived from superior marketing capabilities than 
either research or manufacturing. Research in the U.S. pharmaceuticals sector in the early 
1930s was devoted to developing improvements to basic consumer products, not path-
breaking science in drug discovery.5  
 
It follows that by the mid 1930s even those firms formerly involved in prescription 
medicines in the U.S. were increasingly diversifying away from science-intensive therapies 
towards OTC medicines and toilet goods. For instance, Sterling and Upjohn had both 
begun as producer of alkaloid pain relief products, but in the early 1920s moved into OTC 
products: Sterling into toothpaste, laxative and shaving cream brands; Upjohn into 
multivitamins. Sharp and Dohme still retained its fine chemicals distributorship, but after 
the successful launch of its Sucrets throat lozenges in 1931, the firm moved to augment its 
marketing capabilities. The number of examples could easily be multiplied. 
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Only a small number of conservatively managed producers of prescription medicines 
focused on retaining and building their capabilities in drug manufacturing, specialised 
product knowledge and on developing internal research capabilities. But competition here 
was largely on price. There were very few branded, patented products that were able to 
attract a price premium. So those U.S. pharmaceutical companies not focused on OTC 
products were essentially generics producers in the 1930s (Temin 1979, Huck 2006). They 
had little incentive to invest in R&D. In sum, the U.S. pharmaceuticals industry of the 
1930s was not only far behind its competitors in Europe in ethical pharmaceuticals, but its 
underlying science base was dropping further behind German and Swiss scientific 
capabilities (Kobrak 2002). Yet in less than twenty years the U.S. sector was dominant in 
global pharmaceuticals, as world sales exploded of U.S. invented products that had not 
been known in 1939 (Bud 2007, p.110, Greene 2005). This was technological leapfrogging 
of the first-order. 
 
This survey of the developments of the U.S. pharmaceuticals sector cannot hope to be 
comprehensive. Instead the focus is very much on how the U.S. sector was able to switch 
so dramatically from being dominated by low-tech OTC products to acquire technological 
leadership so quickly, and on the internationalisation strategies used to acquire the know-
how essential to such a transition. The U.S. pharmaceuticals sector internationalised 
relatively early and extensively. But that internationalisation was almost exclusively the 
preserve of market-seeking FDI among OTC and toilet goods producers. 
 
As with many sectors, the opening of initial overseas sales agencies and then branch plants 
was in Canada, the ease of transit to there making it relatively easy to invest and so 
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overcome tariff barriers (Wilkins 1970). A far more important market, yet geographically 
more distant, was Britain. Moreover the UK was also one of the leading sources of 
international expertise in pharmaceuticals. While expertise in synthetic chemistry was 
concentrated in Germany (and to a lesser extent in Switzerland and France), clinical 
research was pre-eminent in Britain. Moreover London was the centre for international 
trade in raw drugs (Corley, p. 9). It followed that the leading British hospitals had acquired 
a reputation for clinical trials, and British drug houses for sourcing the finest quality 
materials. Britain was, in other words, both an important source of demand for consumer 
products and an important source of scientific knowledge for the pharmaceuticals sector. 
Import restrictions meant that producers had an incentive to invest, but (and in contrast to 
Germany) Britain was also relatively open to inward direct investment. So not only did 
several U.S. pharmaceuticals producers open branch plants in Canada, but several also did 
in the UK. That is important because, unlike for Canada, fairly comprehensive data for the 
historic population of entrants into British manufacturing exist, and so it is possible to 
assess the broad trends in internationalisation of the U.S. pharmaceuticals industry by using 
U.S. FDI into British pharmaceuticals manufacturing as indicative of wider trends.  
 
Chart 1 therefore compares the population of all overseas entrants into British 
pharmaceuticals manufacturing for the periods of 1920 to 1940 and from 1945 to 1959. In 
the earlier, slightly longer period the total population was twenty-three entrants, in the later 
period seventeen; the annual rate of entry was therefore broadly similar across the two 
periods. In both periods U.S. parents dominate, with 18 U.S. entrants in the inter-war and 
16 in the post-war periods.6 The striking contrast between the two periods, however, is 
when these British subsidiaries are classified according to whether they were producing 
prescription medicines (P) or OTC goods. In the interwar period fourteen out of eighteen 
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U.S. entrants were to pursue opportunities in the British market for OTC products, only 
four for prescription medicines. That is a striking contrast with the dominance of 
prescription product entrants after World War Two. It was, in other words, FDI by 
toothpaste, cosmetics and antiseptic oil producers (like Lehn & Fink, Kolynos, 
Mentholatum, American Home Products, Lambert, Warner, Pepsodent, Ponds, Bristol 
Myers and Tangee, for example) rather than prescription medicine producers that 
characterised the U.S. inward investment into British pharmaceuticals before 1940. Those 
entrants concerned with the market for prescription products were restricted to Mulford 
(which entered the UK in 1928, but was by then a failing producer of biologicals and 
succumbed to acquisition in 1929), Abbott (exploiting its sodium pentothal anaesthetic, 
which became the most successful anaesthetic product in the world – entered the UK in 
1937), Lilly (a leader in insulin production – entered the UK in 1939) and Gelatin Products 
(a producer of gelatine capsules for pills – entered the UK in 1938). 
 
The U.S. pharmaceuticals sector also had many links with other nations, Canada most 
obviously (where Lilly had acquired its insulin technology from, for example), but also 
with German firms. Moreover, there were other types of alliances with the British market 
apart from FDI, as will be emphasised below. But the data for inward investment into 
British manufacturing effectively capture what branch of the U.S. pharmaceuticals industry 
was most internationalised before 1940. Underlining what was taking place in the domestic 
U.S. market, it was the OTC producers that dominated outward FDI, exploiting FSAs in 
marketing, not science-based research and production.  
 
In stark contrast, the second chart shows that during the period 1945 to 1959 it was 
prescription medicine producers that were the overwhelming majority of entrants into the 
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UK – with ten out of the sixteen U.S. entrants, six of which arrived specifically to 
manufacture antibiotics and related products for the large British market. 
  
The science base of the U.S. pharmaceuticals industry was transformed during the war with 
the revolution in penicillin production capabilities. The discovery of the ‘first successful 
chemical attack’ (Bud 2007, p. 17) on bacteria, the sulphanomides, or the predecessor to 
antibiotics, was in the Bayer laboratories, part of IG Farben, in Germany between 1932 and 
1935. The news of the first of the sulphanomides spread through medical journals, 
prompting pharmaceuticals producers elsewhere to begin experimenting with attempts at 
manufacturing them. The critical competencies required for the commercial production of 
sulpha drugs were, first and foremost, the ability to be able to screen many, many 
(sometimes thousands) of samples of spores growing on organic matter (typically soil), 
laboratory testing (typically on mice) of each potential product, and then designing a 
manufacturing process that would enable the exact dosage to be delivered in a stable form 
to patients large distances away from the manufacturing plant (Bud 2007, Church and 
Tansey 2007). With the IG Farben discovery process published, it was only a matter of 
time before others copied the scientific method of discovery. French, Swiss and British 
producers all had success between 1936 and 1939 with what were highly advanced 
manufacturing techniques. It was notable, however, that Squibb and Merck, the two leading 
U.S. producers of fine chemicals, were initially unable to manufacture sulphas. U.S. 
difficulties were compounded when S.E. Massengill, a small Tennessee producer, 
incompetently killed over 100 people with its sulpha product in 1937. (Bud 2007, pp. 37, 
110). The OTC-dominated population of U.S. pharmaceuticals companies lagged behind 
European and Canadian scientific capabilities and were falling further back. But penicillin 
and war changed all that. 
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Chart 1. U.S. and Other Foreign Entrants into British Pharmaceuticals Manufacturing, 
1920-40, and 1945-59 (Prescription [P] and OTC producers). 
 
1920-1940 (Total entrants = 23)
ROW (5)
US P (4) US OTC (14)
 
1945-59 (Total entrants = 17)
US P (10)
US OTC (6)
ROW (1)
 
Source: Godley 2000 and Bostock and Jones 1994. The chart includes the entire subset of entrants in 
pharmaceuticals - SIC 257 (using UK SIC 1980 three digit codes, following Bostock and Jones 1994). 
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The story of penicillin and its role in the Allied war effort is well known. What is important 
for the purposes here is to note how news of penicillin’s therapeutic efficacy disseminated 
from Britain to the U.S. and so led to a transformation in manufacturing and research 
capabilities there. Alexander Fleming first discovered the mould and its properties while 
working at St Mary’s Hospital, London, in 1928. His attempts to generate interest in it were 
thwarted until war broke out. Then the Oxford scientists, Howard Florey, Ernst Chain, and 
Norman Heatley, devised a technique for penicillin’s extraction and manufacture. 
Manufacturing required, however, considerable industrial experimentation, and in 1941 
Florey was convinced that British firms were unable to divert scarce resources in wartime 
to invest in experimental techniques for mould growing. In the summer of 1941 Florey and 
Heatley went to the U.S. and Canada. The crucial exchange was with scientists at the U.S. 
government’s northern regional research laboratory at Peoria, who had developed expertise 
in fermentation techniques for moulds. Before Florey and Heatley returned, both Merck 
and Squibb agreed to experiment with production techniques, working with the Peoria 
laboratory and the Federal War Production Board. The net result was that by 1942 two U.S. 
and six British pharmaceuticals firms were trying to develop mass production techniques 
for penicillin (Bud 2007, ch. 2, Liebenau 1987a). It was not, however, until the intervention 
of Pfizer from late 1942 that the U.S. industry was able to generate any kind of obvious 
technological lead. Pfizer, a manufacturer of citric acid, had long experience with 
fermentation techniques, and John McKeen, Pfizer’s then Superintendant of its Brooklyn 
plant (and from 1949 its President and then Chairman), worked out a technique for the deep 
fermentation of penicillin. This provided the step-change in productivity required for the 
effective mass production of this ‘wonder drug’ (Weber 1979).  
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With the U.S. government co-ordinating efforts, bids were solicited from as many 
producers as possible, and by early 1944 twenty firms were manufacturing penicillin in the 
U.S., the four leading producers (Pfizer, Merck, Squibb and the Commercial Solvents 
Corporation, which was to exit production shortly after the war), and almost all the other 
manufacturers of prescription pharmaceuticals, as well as just two OTC producers, Bristol 
Myers and American Home Products, that had been able to develop sufficient expertise in 
drug manufacture to produce credible bids by 1943. By the end of the war the leading 
producers dominated output. The top five producers had 88 percent of total penicillin 
output in 1945 (Temin 1979, p. 435). But the U.S. government’s deliberate diffusion of 
manufacturing expertise meant that there was a very competitive environment in the 
immediate post war period. By 1950 the top five producers only had 48 percent of the 
penicillin market, with several of what had been the second-tier producers in the war 
carving out important niches. Lederle and Parke Davis developed novel and patentable 
antibiotics, Upjohn and Bristol Myers variations of Pfizer’s penicillin. Abbott, Lilly, 
Hayden and American Home Products all enjoyed significant shares of the market. By 
1950 42% of AHP’s sales came from its pharmaceuticals division, dominated by 
antibiotics, for instance. 
 
The net effect was that the U.S. government had subsidised the entry into the penicillin 
market in 1943, broadening the population of manufacturers. This prompted a dramatic 
increase in output, subsequent price falls and a much reduced profitability in the early 
1950s (Bud 2007, p. 106). By 1955 what Temin describes as the ‘broad-spectrum antibiotic 
cartel’ (of Pfizer, Squibb, Lederle, Bristol and Parke Davis) had emerged. In a break from 
industry practice, they enforced their patent rights and higher prices, so causing a shake-out 
of penicillin production.7 In 1955 the leading four producers were responsible for 86 
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percent of total output (Temin 1979, p. 435). But those firms exiting penicillin production 
did not exit prescription medicines; rather they were then responsible for drug discovery in 
a range of derivative products. Lilly, Abbott and Merck discovered different antibiotics, 
Sharp and Dohme novel sulphonamides, Merck an important diuretic and an anti-parasite 
animal health product, and Upjohn an important anti-diabetes product, all from similar 
methods and source materials as the original IG Farben sulphonamide process. American 
Home Products, Upjohn, and Smith Kline and French also all developed new products 
(Temin 1979).  
 
Only one pre-war pharmaceutical producer that had not been involved in the U.S. 
Government’s crash programme of penicillin production went on to prosper in the 1950s - 
Smith, Kline and French. Conversely the overwhelming majority of the OTC producers of 
the 1930s were not involved in penicillin production during the war. Almost invariably 
they then failed to develop strong prescription medicine-based pharmaceuticals businesses 
afterwards. Plough, Warner-Hudnet, Lambert and many, many others came into this 
category.8 Government intervention during the war therefore not only subsidised the 
creation of the core competence of the U.S. penicillin producers – the deep fermentation 
technique – but also effectively decided the composition of the population of the post-war 
industry through its 1943 tender process. It then becomes important to understand how 
those firms whose bids the U.S. government accepted in 1943 were able to demonstrate 
credible penicillin manufacturing capabilities, in particular given that only five or six years 
earlier even Merck and Squibb were struggling to develop anti-infective manufacturing 
facilities. It is here that the importance of internationalisation strategies to acquire 
important know-how becomes clear. 
 
 24  
   
Internationalisation and its role in technological leapfrogging 
 
The traditional understanding of parent-subsidiary relationship is one where the parent 
develops some sort of FSA, and then exploits it in some overseas market (Vernon 1966 and 
1979, Dunning 1992). But recent analysis of FDI in knowledge-intensive sectors suggests 
that internationalisation may be as much about technology-enhancing as technology-
exploiting strategies, with deliberate attempts to acquire know-how from overseas 
(Cantwell 1995, Cantwell and Mudambi 2005). There is also considerable evidence of 
similar know-how acquisition strategies being pursued with greater or lesser degrees of 
deliberation among those wartime penicillin producers. Some clearly pursued a 
conventional product-cycle strategy, some sought overseas technology through a variety of 
alliances and overseas investments, and some who did both.  
 
Some of the U.S. producers had developed their own technology and engaged in FDI in the 
classic product-cycle manner. Abbott, as mentioned above, in anaesthetics, followed what 
Parke Davis had done thirty years earlier (and then in anti-toxins) in establishing a British 
branch plant. But, as the earlier part of this paper has made clear, the U.S. industry 
typically did not possess the key scientific technology in pharmaceuticals – Abbott, with its 
path-breaking anaesthetics, was very much an exception. Rather U.S. producers mostly had 
to source essential know-how from Europe and Canada. This was done either through what 
can be described as a legacy effect, or through informal alliances and formal joint ventures, 
or, rarely, through acquisition. 
 
Merck, Squibb and Lilly are perhaps the best examples of successful U.S. antibiotics 
producers benefiting from long-established channels to foreign sources of superior 
 25  
   
technology. Merck was originally established as the subsidiary of a leading German 
producer of pharmaceuticals. Uniquely after the World War One sequestrations, the newly 
independent U.S. Merck remained in the hands of the same family. One of the conditions 
was that the two companies should no longer collaborate commercially. However, the two 
firms continued to collaborate on technical matters, largely as they had before the war. 
Unlike its U.S. peers, Merck therefore gained privileged access to new developments in 
German pharmaceuticals during the 1930s giving them crucial knowledge in sulpha 
production (Merck Archives). 
 
Lilly had established a close commercial relationship with the leading Canadian research 
laboratory, Connaught Laboratories of Toronto University, when they agreed to 
commercialise the Canadian innovation of semi-synthetic insulin in 1923. Close links 
continued between Lilly and Toronto. When Florey and Heatley broadcast their hopes for 
penicillin in 1941, the Canadian scientists were not slow in developing it. Lilly, as the 
longstanding commercial partners of the Connaught group, benefited from early exposure 
to penicillin laboratory production techniques pioneered abroad. Less is known about 
Squibb, but the firm’s entrepreneurial CEO from 1904 was a German immigrant and 
former leading employee of E. Merck & Co, who also retained research links with 
Germany. 
 
But proximity to foreign science and technology was not sufficient for the subsequent 
development of technological competences. Of all the firms in the U.S. pharmaceuticals 
sector in the 1920s and 1930s, Sterling was the closest to the world’s leading source of 
technological advancement, yet did absolutely nothing about it. 
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Sterling bought Bayer’s U.S. subsidiary, after the U.S. Government had sequestrated the 
firm in World War One. Sterling then marketed worldwide Bayer’s innovative synthetic 
analgesic as ‘Bayer’s Aspirin’, prompting threats of litigation from the former German 
parent. In 1923 agreement was reached which prompted the creation of the Winthrop 
subsidiary as a fifty-fifty Sterling-Bayer (now I.G. Farben) venture. In return for ceding 
half its claims on ‘Bayer’s Aspirin’ back to the German company, Sterling acquired access 
to and the rights to commercialise in North America all of Bayer/ IG Farben’s research in 
ethical pharmaceuticals from then on. This surely was the ultimate opportunity to leverage 
marketing capabilities to acquire scarce research capabilities. Yet despite all the privileged 
access to new medicinal compounds (and recall that Bayer was the leader in the discovery 
of the new sulphas), Sterling retained its focus on marketing ‘Bayer’s Aspirin’ and other 
branded OTC products. Sterling enjoyed easier access to advanced pharmaceutical 
knowledge than any other U.S. firm, yet chose to remain locked-in to its OTC product 
range and its marketing capabilities. It only entered research for ethical pharmaceuticals in 
the 1970s. 
 
Perhaps more interesting examples, at least for this paper’s purposes, are those U.S. 
producers that deliberately used their overseas’ subsidiaries or alliances to acquire 
important know-how. The best examples here would include Parke Davis’ use of its long 
established British subsidiary, the alliance between Pfizer and the British firm Kemball 
Bishop, and Bristol’s joint venture with Boots. 
 
Parke Davis had established a British subsidiary as early as 1902 to develop the British 
market for its advanced anti toxins. But it quickly developed an important relationship with 
St Mary’s Hospital, acquiring the rights to market innovative vaccines and sera developed 
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by St Mary’s staff. The Parke Davis British subsidiary was, in other words, increasingly 
concerned with knowledge acquisition rather than the overseas exploitation of its parent 
company’s proprietary knowledge. It was a very successful relationship (Church and 
Tansey 2007, p. 222). It also meant that Parke Davis had privileged exposure to the earliest 
of discussions about penicillin in Fleming’s laboratory at St Mary’s and the mechanisms to 
be able to communicate that potential back to its parent. 
 
Pfizer had established an informal alliance with the British manufacturers of citric acid, 
Kemball Bishop, sharing technology and manufacturing processes. In 1936 Kemball 
Bishop licensed a new manufacturing process from Pfizer and John McKeen was seconded 
to London to design and build the new plant. On his return to New York in 1938 he then 
designed and oversaw the construction first of the firm’s Brooklyn plant, and then, in late 
1941, the construction of a pilot plant for the laboratory production of penicillin, the first 
step towards Pfizer’s deep-fermentation process techniques. McKeen’s critical innovation 
undoubtedly took place in New York, but the year and a half spent designing the new 
Kemball and Bishop factory gave him many of the foundations for the what was the 
revolutionary innovation in the chemical engineering of penicillin production, first in the 
laboratory plant in late 1941, then in a pilot plant in 1942, before scaling-up for mass 
production in 1943 onwards (Weber 1979). 
 
Bristol also benefited from an earlier established alliance. As a constituent member of Drug 
Inc., Bristol had a commercial relationship with Boots in the UK, after Boots had been 
acquired by the U.S. firm in 1920. After the demise of Drug Inc. in 1933, Bristol continued 
the relationship through a formal joint venture for the British company to manufacture and 
distribute its products. Bristol was, of course, dominated by its range of OTC products, its 
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key strengths were in marketing. Boots was known for its nationwide chain of chemists and 
druggist stores. But during the 1920s and 1930s, Boots deliberately invested in its scientific 
capabilities, increasing its research and development base. In the 1930s its chief scientist 
experimented with one of Fleming’s penicillin mould samples. In the end, perhaps 
unluckily, it led Boots to develop a commercially unsuccessful version (Bud 2007). But it 
also gave Bristol access to detailed knowledge about how to manufacture penicillin, 
knowledge that gave it the possibility of acquiring sufficient credibility to have its bid for 
penicillin production accepted by the War Production Board in 1943, despite its OTC 
background. 
 
Like Bristol, American Home Products, or AHP (now Wyeth), was a producer of OTC 
products in the late 1930s not prescription medicines. It was a 1926 merger of several 
producers of OTC products like toothpaste and laxatives and then expanded rapidly 
overseas. It acquired the moribund Wyeth from Harvard University in 1931 and its Anacin 
(Anadin in the UK) analgesic, which it promoted aggressively with great success, so 
funding an acquisition spree. This led to diversification into prescription medicines, 
including a license agreement for an anti-arthritis vaccine in 1936 and acquiring the British 
firm Boyle Pharmaceutical Products in 1938. AHP also acquired an interest in the Chester 
County Mushroom Company in 1942, which was successful in developing techniques for 
surface culture production of penicillin mould. While this technology was shortly to be 
superceded by events at Pfizer, AHP at least was able to acquire its initial manufacturing 
capabilities in penicillin. Then shortly after the U.S. entry into war, it also acquired the 
Canadian pharmaceutical company Ayerst, McKenna and Harrison. This Montreal-based 
producer of hormones had earlier collaborated with Glaxo, but, after Florey and Heatley’s 
tour, it had also developed techniques to produce penicillin. In 1942 it had been contracted 
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to provide the antibiotic to the Canadian military. Through these acquisitions, AHP was 
therefore a strong contender for one of the contracts for penicillin production.  
 
Whether it was through exploiting the privileged legacy of historical relationships with 
superior sources of know-how, or whether it was through the mutual gains in formal or 
informal alliances and joint ventures, or, as with AHP, through acquisition, all these 
leading U.S. companies were able to utilise internationalisation strategies to leapfrog over 
European competitors during and after the war. Clearly the effect of U.S. government 
policy during the war was of far greater importance in creating the industry, both in 
stimulating knowledge sharing and promoting competition, as well as in partially 
destroying the most important source of foreign competition. But the examples here 
suggest that those firms that were able to acquire sufficient technical competence to be able 
to be considered by the U.S. government during the critical bidding process in late 1943 
had all used a variety of strategies to acquire superior knowledge from overseas.9 The 
American examples of successful technological leapfrogging during the antibiotics era 
suggests that that the Indian generics companies of recent years may indeed successfully be 
able to move into genomics. It is to this group of firms that section 4 now turns. 
 
4. Indian Generics Producers and the attempts to integrate biotechnology 
 
In India, the Patent Act of 1970 and government investment in the drug industry is widely 
acknowledged as having infused life into the Indian pharmaceutical industry.  Increasing 
drug prices in a sector dominated by western multinationals presented a national healthcare 
problem.  Indian policy makers responded by weakening the patent law to recognise only 
process patents and instituted price control over essential drugs. The 1970s and 80s saw the 
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entry of a number of indigenous manufacturers, who set up production units of different 
sizes. Thus, in 1970, the Indian market was clearly dominated by multinational firms: eight 
of the top ten firms were MNCs. After two decades following the 1970 Patent Act, the 
Indian market was dominated by domestic firms.10 The availability of trained manpower, 
comparative ease of imitation and a strong chemistry base among Indian research institutes 
supported these manufacturers.  By 1996, only 4 of the top ten firms were foreign 
multinationals.  Domestic firms dominated and their share of the domestic market climbed 
from a mere 10% in 1970 to 70% by 1989.  
 
Price controls on drugs meant that the domestic market was never the most profitable one 
for Indian firms.  Estimates suggest that while India accounts for 8% of the drugs market 
by volume, it only accounts for 1% of the value of this market. By the mid 1980s market 
leaders such as Ranbaxy had already begun to explore export markets in Asia and Africa.  
Much of this activity was centred around the export of pharmaceutical ingredients, though 
export of formulations (what are known more generally as generics) also started rising. 
Through the 1990s the export of bulk drugs grew at rates of 15% per annum, while the 
export of formulations grew faster at 20% per annum.   
 
Athreye, Kale and Ramani (2008) note that another strategy induced by price controls in 
the domestic market was the quest for ever cheaper processes to manufacture known and 
patented drugs.  A handful of Indian firms had invested in R&D to manufacture ‘copycats’, 
reverse engineer the processes, bring down costs, and then patent any new process 
innovation. These were typically then licensed back to MNEs operating in the country.  
The profits from the process innovation were thus shared between the innovating Indian 
firms and the MNE firm that marketed the ‘brand’. Ranbaxy, in particular was also 
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investing large amounts in new process R&D11 under the direction of Dr. Parminder Singh, 
who had been educated in the US.  Bhandari (2005) notes that Parminder Singh pursued 
this program despite reservations from the Board of Directors at Ranbaxy and that in doing 
so he had his eye on the lucrative generics market in the US.   
 
The passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 12  had reduced entry costs into the US 
generics market for all manufacturers of generic drugs.  This was a lucrative business 
opportunity for the Indian firms who enjoyed a low cost advantage of about 30% relative to 
other manufcturers. Bower and Sulej (2005) estimate that the main cost advantages of 
Indian firms lay in cheap active pharmaceutical ingredients ( which form about 50% of the 
cost of a drug) followed by lower costs of scientific labour.  The opportunity also arose to 
reinvest some of the money made from the generics business to gain technological 
advantages in discovering new biotechnology products/ therapeutics and thus leapfrog into 
the big league. 
 
In 1991, the pioneering R&D attempts at Ranbaxy bore fruit and they successfully patented 
a non-infringing process patent for Cefaclor (a drug sold by Eli Lilly) resulting in a jpoint 
venture with Eli-Lilly for the new process. But soon other Indian firms such as Dr. Reddy’s 
labs, Lupin laboratories, Sun Pharmaceuticals, Wockhardt and Cipla joined the race to find 
cheaper processes for drugs that were due to go off-patent.  Many Indian firms saw the 
opportunity to plough back the profits from their generics exports into research aimed at 
finding new molecules using the new techniques associated with biotechnology to make 
and test drugs and vaccines.  
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As is well known, the 1990s also saw a transformation in the Indian domestic environment.  
In 1991, the economy was liberalised and the pharmaceutical sector was de-licensed, with 
most drugs removed from price control. By 2004 only 76 drugs (26%) remained under 
price control.  India’s entry to the WTO prompted both strengthened patent protection and 
a significantly increased life of a patent from seven years to twenty years.   Ramani and 
Venkatramani (2001) identify a large variety of strategies used by Indian pharmaceutical 
producers post-1995, where some firms explicitly targeted the development and  
integration of biotechnology capabilities.  They identify the following specific objectives 
for firms that invested in competence widening measures: 
(i) Process improvements to produce ‘me too’ products, concentrating on near to expiry 
patents but with an eye on including biotechnology when these type of patents are no 
longer available. (e.g. Dr. Reddy’s, Cipla, Wockhardt) 
(ii) To create easy to make diagnostic kits based on biotechnology methods as a simple way 
to learn about the technology (e.g. Ranbaxy) 
(iii) To create new chemical entities and speciality chemicals (e.g. Dr. Reddy’s, Malladi 
Drugs) 
(iv) To create therapeutics for other developing countries (e.g. Kopran and its R&D into 
waterborne diseases) 
(v) Invest in biotechnology through diversification into non-healthcare biotechnology (e.g. 
Cadilla’s alliance with a  Dutch firm for tissue culture and aquaculture products) 
 
While all these strategies represent different developmental paths, it is too early to say 
which of these will definitely translate into long lasting competitive advantage for an 
Indian pharmaceutical firm.  In contrast to the US firms by the 1950s, the Indian situation 
is still open-ended, but nevertheless Indian firms have been able to develop an important 
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presence in global pharmaceuticals. Bower and Sulej (2005) also observe that the leading 
Indian firms steadily increased their cash generative capability and profitability before 
attempting to develop a “discovery” capability and argue that this strategy contrasts sharply 
with those of Western biotechnology companies, which typically started with some 
“discovery” capability before attracting finance and complementary expertise through 
strategic alliances with pharmaceutical firms, venture capital and public equity finance.   
 
Indian technological capabilities may have befitted from advantageous financial terms, but 
recent events suggest that those capabilities are likely to continue to improve. The 
established Indian strengths in reverse engineering and in generics may become 
increasingly important as biotechnology drugs increasingly come off patent. From 2002 to 
2004 20 biotechnology drugs lost their patent. But in 2005 the patents of 13 US 
biotechnology products expired. The numbers of expiring patents will continue to grow.  
 
The Indian firms’ abilities to push their strengths in the bio-generics and vaccine market 
and penetrate the European and American markets in the future are likely also to be 
dependent on the degree to which they adhere to international standards of good 
manufacturing and clinical standards. But the biotechnology industry associations are well 
aware of this (Athreye and Chaturvedi 2006). There is, in other words, substantial evidence 
of technological convergence in during the 1990s and increasingly since 2000 of the 
beginnings of Indian leapfrogging in some processes. Much of the key know-how was 
acquired from overseas.  
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Internationalisation and its role in technological leapfrogging 
 
Internationalisation in the form of increasing outward investments has been an important 
aspect of the leapfrogging strategies adopted by Indian pharma firms.  Outward investment 
from Indian Pharmaceutical firms increased dramatically after 1990. Using outward foreign 
investments approvals data, Pradhan and Alakshendra (2006) show that the number of 
outward investing firms increased from 11 in the pre-1990 period to 55 in the 1990-99 
period.  The firms with the most outward FDI approvals were the leading generics 
manufacturers viz. Ajanta Pharmaceuticals (17 projects) followed by Ranbaxy Laboratories 
(13), Core Healthcare, Dabur and Sun Pharmaceuticals with 7 projects each.  
 
Second,they show that the direction of outward investment changed from being 
concentrated on Asia and Africa to encompass developed countries of the West, with the 
US and UK emerging as leading destinations for such investments.13  Third, the purpose of 
investment in developed and developing countries differed significantly as Table 1 below 
shows.  Investments directed towards developed countries are for marketing and trading 
purposes, while those targeted at developing countries are for establishing manufacturing 
subsidiaries.  This indicates a clear strategy of exploiting and leveraging global location 
advantages.  Developing countries are more attractive places to start local production 
because they can enhance their cost advantages of the Indian firms and the firms also 
benefit from the soft patent regimes prevalent in these countries.  By contrast, their 
investments in developed countries as Table 1 indicates are mainly to build their 
distribution networks in the more regulated western markets. 
 
 35  
   
Table 1: Nature of Outward Greenfield Projects over Developed and Developing 
Countries, 1990–1999 
      
Nature of 
Projects 
Developed Countries Developing Countries 
 Number  Per cent  Number  Per cent 
Manufacturing  16  36.4  35  52.2 
Manufacturing 
and marketing 
 3  6.8  5  7.5 
Marketing and 
Trading  
25  56.8  27  40.3 
Total  44  100  67  100 
Source: Pradhan, JP and  Alakshendra A (2006), Table 7. 
 
Pradhan and Alakshendra (2006) also point to changes in the mode of entry that has 
characterised internationalisation of firms from this sector.  While Joint Ventures were the 
predominant form of outward investment by Indian Pharma firms prior to 1990, between 
1990-99 both joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries were equally preferred modes 
of entry.14 Since 2000 acquisitions have become the most preferred form of entry into 
foreign markets.  The popularity of acquisitions can be overstated.  Policy regulations 
created many restrictions for the free outward flow of foreign exchange prior to full capital 
market liberalisation of the economy.  So the new popularity of acquisitions in international 
outward investment probably merely reflects the relaxed policy towards outflows of foreign 
exchange from the Indian economy.  Acquisitions have probably also been helped by 
strong financial positions in international markets enjoyed by the large Indian generics 
producers noted earlier.    
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Prominent countries where companies have been acquired are: USA (14), UK(8), Germany 
(5) , Brazil and China (3 each) and Belgium, France and Italy with 2 acquisitions each.   
Only 8 firms have accounted for about 70% of all acquisitions viz, Ranbaxy Laboratories 
(9), Sun Pharmaceuticals and Glenmark Pharmaceuticals (5 acquisitions each), Dr. Reddy’s 
and Jubilant Organosys (4 acqusitions each), Nicholas Piramal, Wockhardt and Aurobindo 
Pharma (2 acqusitions each).   
 
Analysing the purpose of acquisitions shows three reasons dominate: the need to acquire 
manufacturing facilities and market share in particular locations and the desire for 
technological and brand assets.15 Whilst technological and brand assets clearly reflect a 
‘buying’ in of firm specific advantage using relatively strong financial market positions, the 
acquisition for manufacturing facilities represents better positioning with regard to 
complementary assets.  Not only will the possession of such facilities give Indian firms an 
advantage in manufacturing generic versions of expired biotechnology and other patents, 
they are also fungible assets in the sense that any new product developed through the firms 
own R&D efforts can also be pushed through these distribution networks.   A closer 
inspection of the sequence of acquisition also reveals that the first international acquisitions 
made by Indian firms were for laboratories and brand assets.  Later investments for each 
firm were to acquire distribution networks and generics market share.16 A number of 
contract manufacturing agreements have also been signed by many of the internationalising 
firms with western MNES with varying degrees of technological collaboration built into 
the contracts.17 Nicholas Piramal, for example, has cemented its relationships with many of 
the former parent companies of the Indian subsidiaries, which Nicholas Piramal has 
acquired in the course of its growth.  
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As was the case with the U.S. firms earlier, a variety of internationalisation strategies were 
deployed by Indian firms to acquire core assets to enhance their competences in the global 
generics market. Acquiring new biotechnology-based NCE discovery capabilities needed 
systematic investments in own R&D, but this has had to be complemented with 
internationalisation strategies of various kinds in the late 1990s and since 2000. In each 
case, the proximate reasons that dictated the form of internationalisation was a bit different. 
 
Interviews with firms like Ranbaxy, Dr. Reddy’s Foundation and Wockhardt - all of whom 
have plans to develop biotechnology capabilities suggest that their major constraint to 
doing so is the lack of adequately trained biologists in India.  Historically the Indian 
science base has developed good doctors and good chemists but very few dedicated centres 
of research in biology.  Kale et al (2006) show that several Indian firms tried to attract and 
employ returning scientists who had worked in US or European MNEs as a way to boost 
the firms’ skill set and technological competence in these deficient areas.  However, this 
strategy met with only limited success, since many returnees at the senior level had 
concerns about the working environment in India, while post-doctoral researchers were 
often too specialised to fit into a firm at an early stage of discovery capability.18 
 
The drive to fill skill gaps led to a very early internationalisation of R&D in the case of Dr. 
Reddy’s.  Kale et al ( 2006) note that after establishing discovery research in Hyderabad, 
Dr. Reddy’s wanted to introduce modern skills such as drug discovery based on genomics 
and proteomics and using rational drug design but struggled. They quote the former R&D 
president of DRF as saying, “We could not recruit the requisite skills because it’s not the 
one scientist, you need a whole team and we could not do this for the period of three years. 
We located scientist but 1 or 2 may be willing to come out but they had inhibitions and 
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they needed lot of time and they were unable to take decisions. Then we decided there is no 
point in waiting. We can not bring people here; we will move our lab there”. Thus in 2000, 
DRF set up a lab in Atlanta, US dedicated to discovery and design of novel therapeutics 
using molecular genomics and proteomics approaches. The lab, Reddy US Therapeutics Inc 
(RUSTI for short) quickly built a team of 12 scientists, and in seven years the organisation 
has obtained twelve US patents.19 
 
Ranbaxy has also systematically used its internationalisation in the US to build its 
distribution network and to concentrate on the developmental aspects of R&D.  Its 
internationalisation efforts in the US started with the joint venture with Eli Lilly for the 
manufacture of Cefaclor in 1992.  This joint venture was dissolved in 1995 and in return 
for an early dissolution Ranbaxy obtained brand recognition by buying rights to 
manufacture all of the products for which Eli Lilly was the only supplier.  In 1995, they 
made their first acquisition in the US (Ohm labs) to benefit from its FDA approved 
manufacturing facilities.  This was followed with the setting up of their own 100% 
subsidiary in the US for the manufacture of products under the Ranbaxy brand name.  
However, unlike all the other Indian firms that have used internationalisation to source 
technology directly from abroad, Ranbaxy has not yet drawn a single patent from its 
overseas laboratories or acquisitions.  It has rather used these investments to gain 
regulatory and legal expertise for its existing range of products - capabilities recognised as 
being important to the development stage of a new chemical entity. 
 
 Wockhardt placed biotechnology at the heart of its strategy in the early 1990s and spent 20 
-30% of its total research budget on biotech R&D. In 1993, the company initiated an 
international joint venture with a Research Centre (ICGEB) in Trieste, Italy for research on 
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recombinant products such as Hep-B vaccine, EPO and human insulin.  However, the 
company called the deal off after 3-4 years because of a lack of output. Subsequently, 
Wockhardt set up its own R&D centre at Aurangabad in 1994 and in 1995, entered into 
another international joint venture with Rhein Biotech, a German firm, for the development 
and manufacture of Recombinant Biopharmaceuticals. The venture was funded by equities 
on the Wockhardt side and resulted in the successful production of the hepatitis B vaccine, 
Biovac-B in 2001. However, due to a conflict of interest over the rights to this product, the 
joint venture was dissolved and Wockhardt bought Rhein’s shares and took full ownership 
of the subsidiary. In 2004 Wockhardt acquired the German pharmaceutical company 
‘Esparma’, GmbH to enter Germany, the largest generic drug market in Europe. Esparma 
has a portfolio of 135 marketing authorisations, of which 67 are in Germany. The company 
also has nine international patents and 94 trademarks to its name.   
 
Ranbaxy, DRF, Wockhardt, as well as Nicholas Piramal have, unknowingly, mimicked the 
earlier case of U.S. entrants into penicillin production. First those with the stronger links to 
overseas know-how developed stronger R&D capabilities in generics.  Then, as the 
potential in genomics became clearer, have been instrumental in acquiring biotechnology 
capabilities from overseas. 
 
Patent data help us to establish the success of these strategies in building technological 
strengths.  The patents filed by Indian inventors have been on the rise in the USPTO and 
one analysis20 of patents filed in biotechnology and related sectors (in classes 210, 264, 
424, 435, 514, 530, 536, 549, 800) at the USPTO reveals that 60% of the total 746 patents 
filed by Indian resident inventors were assigned to government or research institutions 
(dominated by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) with 383 patents). 
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Patents assigned to the generics pharmaceutical company Dr Reddy's constituted the next 
largest proportion after CSIR (totalling 31 or 4%). Closely following were Dabur Research 
Foundation, part of the multinational Dabur Group (with 29 patents), and the generics 
pharmaceutical company Ranbaxy Laboratories (28). Moreover, apart from Ranbaxy, the 
other Indian companies have also successfully filed patents from their international 
subsidiaries. More narrow definitions of biotechnology (based for example on 
classifications developed by Bronwyn Hall) however, reveal that no Indian firm has 
successfully integrated biotechnology into its range of technological competences.  This 
disagreement is perhaps not surprising given the short amount of time in which Indian 
firms have been engaged in NCE efforts. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
The Indian strategy of investing to acquire new technological capability from overseas in 
this most knowledge-intensive of all sectors has been widely commented on, with few 
believing it to be a recipe for lasting success. But the example of U.S. pharmaceutical 
leapfrogging European leaders in the 1940s suggests that there may be more legitimacy in 
the strategy than critics allow.  Though our starting point was the similarities between the 
two cases, the narratives in section 3 and 4 clearly highlight that the environmental contexts 
in the two periods were very different: the policy environments were clearly different, with 
world war two dominating the earlier case, perhaps even precipitating it and unlike the US 
story the Indian story is far from over. In this section we discuss more systematically the 
similarities and differences in the leapfrogging strategies of the two groups of firms. 
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First, let us examine the similarities. Indian firms had developed capabilities in particular 
kinds of manufacturing and reverse engineering. The U.S. firms had mostly developed 
marketing capabilities during the 1930s, such was the growth of sales in the OTC and toilet 
goods markets compared with prescription medicines. Only two pharmaceutical firms 
(Merck and Squibb) and one non-pharmaceutical firm (Pfizer) were augmenting 
manufacturing strengths. None of these had developed research or knowledge capabilities 
in what was to be the core science bases before the late 1930s. There was nevertheless 
sufficient general information in the scientific literature for experimentation to begin. 
However, critical items of know-how mostly had to come from abroad. Yet, in both cases 
the study appears to suggest that the firms were aware of weaknesses in their range of 
assets and were investing in acquiring know-how from overseas in order to compensate.  
 
In both the Indian case and the earlier U.S. case internationalisation in its various forms has 
played a major role in compensating for the absence of particular kinds of pre-requisites 
required for leap-frogging. Thus, the strong similarities between the two leapfrogging 
episodes arise because of the juxtaposition of globalisation with technological 
discontinuity.  In both cases, firms with relatively low technological competences were 
keen to exploit internationalisation for technology acquisition. The strategies used by 
partiucalr firms varies although here too there are strong similarities between the two 
groups. Nicholas Piramal, for example, almost copying Merck in exploiting the legacy of 
earlier parent-subsidiary relationships. Wockhardt, like Parke Davis, Lilly and Bristol, 
engaged in alliances and joint ventures with overseas laboratories. Ranbaxy developed its 
manufacturing capabilities in alliance with Eli Lilly, perhaps in a similar fashion to Pfizer’s 
relationship with Kemball Bishop. 
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The internationalisation strategies adopted for successful leapfrogging necessarily varied, 
partly no doubt reflecting the differences in the economic and policy contexts.  Thus, U.S. 
firms were unable to acquire European firms once war had begun there in 1939, for 
example. Further, in the 1940s the industry’s efforts were focused on just one product – 
penicillin, and solving the problem of its mass production. In contrast, Indian firms found it 
hard to make acquisitions abroad before 2000 due to domestic foreign exchange related 
restrictions.  Furthermore, breaking into biotechnology-based NCE discovery today is a far 
more complex business than designing large-scale manufacturing facilities for penicillin 
based antibiotics.  
 
In the U.S. the combination of an exceptional degree of government intervention, with the 
windfall gain of basic technology available freely from the Oxford scientists meant that the 
pharmaceuticals sector was transformed. The firms that became successful in the 1940s 
were atypical of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry of the 1930s. They were the very small 
number of conservative, manufacturing pharmaceutical and specialist chemical firms, along 
with several pharmaceuticals companies that retained manufacturing strengths, even while 
diversifying into branded OTC lines during the 1930s. Only two, AHP and Bristol, out of 
all the vast number of OTC and toilet goods producers made the transition into penicillin 
production by 1943. Explaining how these firms were able to acquire the key 
manufacturing capabilities to have been considered potentially capable of manufacturing 
penicillin is only partly generalisable, as they each had different development paths. What 
we can say definitively is that it was not privileged access to overseas know-how alone 
which firms became penicillin producers. After all, on paper Sterling was the prime 
candidate for developing sulphas in the U.S. But even after the potential returns to sulphas 
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became known in the late-1930s, Sterling was unwilling to erode the value of its marketing 
capabilities by switching resources into science-based research and production. 
 
Using Steinmueller’s four pre-requisites for technological leapfrogging to order the 
discussion, we can suggest that in the case of the US pharmaceutical industry in 1941, there 
was clearly sufficient absorptive capacity to produce or use technology among the market 
leaders of Merck, Squibb and Pfizer, as well as among the follower pharmaceutical 
producers (like Parke Davis, Lilly, Upjohn, Sharp and Dohme and so on), albeit to a lesser 
extent (precondition #1). But until the Oxford scientists’ tour of summer of 1941 and the 
critical exchange with the Peoria laboratory that led to the breakthrough on production 
media, the leading U.S. firms remained significantly behind foreign competitors in their 
access to key equipment, manufacturing techniques and technological know-how (pre-
condition #2). During the war, the U.S. government took over the role of industry co-
ordinator (delegating much of this to the Peoria laboratory), making the critical decision 
about which firms it gave licenses for wartime production. The U.S. government, in other 
words, subsidised the diffusion of complementary technological capabilities throughout the 
population of its selected wartime producers (precondition #3). After 1945 the net result 
was a crowded market, with output soaring, prices falling and a race for product 
innovation. By 1950 the market share of the original leading firms had more than halved. 
By 1955, however, five firms had created what was effectively a patent pool, driving out 
non-patent holders and putting a floor on the price of the new broad-spectrum antibiotics. 
Temin’s (1979) analysis of this concludes that the key to cartel membership was not 
technological capabilities, but marketing. The winners were those firms with some 
technological capabilities (acquired through membership of the government wartime 
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producer group) and those who had developed and integrated either existing or wholly new 
marketing capabilities (precondition #4).  
 
Internationalisation through outward investment in the U.S. case was therefore mostly a 
less instrumental route to capturing new knowledge than among the Indian firms today. 
The U.S. pharmaceuticals firms with manufacturing capabilities (not, in other words, the 
OTC and toilet goods firms) typically used information from alliances with overseas’ 
laboratories or firms as a way of broadening their understanding of potential new 
developments: the best examples here being Merck, Parke Davis, and Lilly. The war 
interrupted, and, after US government intervention, sped up developments. Indeed even 
among the OTC and toilet goods producers, Bristol and AHP used overseas sources to 
diversify into acquiring pharmaceuticals manufacturing capabilities during the late 1930s 
and early 1940s, thus proving to be the exceptions making the rule of OTC firms being 
unable or unwilling – like Sterling – to move into science based manufacturing. Acquiring 
know-how from overseas was, in other words, largely the differentiating factor between 
those firms able to present credible bids to be included in the wartime penicillin production 
pool and those omitted. Internationalisation and the global search for technological 
knowledge was mostly the route to inclusion, inclusion largely dictated the population set 
for the future U.S. pharmaceuticals industry. 
 
Internationalisation through outward investment may however, be more crucial to the 
success of technological leapfrogging in the Indian case.  Unlike in the 1940s there are no 
leading scientists willing to give blueprints about how biotechnology may be used in 
vaccine or generic drug production.  The IPR system was more monopolised in the 1990s 
than it was in the 1930s.  Again using the Steinmueller framework we can see that though 
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the level of absorptive capacity for organic chemistry in Indian firms is high (due to the 
weak patent regime of 1970) most firms have little experience of finding new molecules 
and the interface between biology and chemistry.  However, the market leaders, Ranbaxy, 
Dr. Reddy’s, do show some evidence of this capacity in their patenting profile 
(precondition #1).  Access to technical know-how for Indian firms is constrained by the 
nature of the international patent regime, whereby product patents are strictly enforced.  
Greater degrees of internationalisation, however, do allow Indian firms to access equipment 
and manufacturing facilities both through international trade and overseas acquisitions 
(precondition#2).  Internationalisation through overseas acquisition has also been an 
important in the acquisition of complementary capabilities (through acquisitions and 
strategic alliances).  The role of ensuring the compatibility/ensuring quality of different 
stages of production has been taken over by international standards settings agencies such 
as the FDA.  It is estimated that India has the largest number of US FDA approved plants 
outside of the US (precondition#3).  Leading Indian firms are investing heavily in 
downstream capabilities, such as brand development and distribution networks, though 
capabilities in new product design are still scarce.  However, the preferred strategy of the 
leading firms, viz concentrating on drugs that are likely to go off-patent also obviates the 
need for better developed marketing abilities, as their target markets are already well 
defined (precondition#4). 
 
But the differences in strategies pursued for leapfrogging are also illuminating, and the 
most striking difference is the strong Indian preference since 2000 for internationalising 
through acquiring target firms in western markets, a little like Korean firms in the 1990s. 
The acquisition route to acquiring know-how was unusual among the earlier U.S. firms. 
Only AHP and Bristol (via the legacy of its earlier acquisition) pursuing it. Of course much 
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of this difference may be explained by how much easier it has been to finance and gain 
permits to acquire western firms compared with the late 1930s. But it is notable that the 
only U.S. producers to gain know-how through acquisition were the two that had the least 
science-based capabilities by the late 1930s, the two specialist OTC producers.  This may 
be suggestive of the acquisition route being particularly optimal for those entrants with 
relatively weak firm specific advantages in their attempts to leapfrog incumbents. Those 
U.S. firms with existing firm specific advantages in science-based manufacturing may have 
been in far better positions to negotiate alliances with British and Canadian partners. 
Bristol and AHP may simply have been viewed as too unlikely to be able to contribute to a 
partnership. 
 
At moments of technological discontinuity, when uncertainty over outcomes increases, 
alliances between strong partners are always likely to be the preferred organisational 
structure. Both partners have strong ex ante claims to the residual rights on the eventual 
outcome, but the level of uncertainty is too high for this to be reduced to a contractible 
relationship. Firms with lesser FSAs at the outset, like the U.S. OTC producers and, 
perhaps, like the Indian firms today, are unable to build alliances (Wockhardt, as we noted 
failed successively to develop technologies within alliance relationships), and so have to 
acquire targets instead.   
 
Moreover, it is at moments of technological discontinuity that the spillover of knowledge is 
at its highest, as that is when firms are least certain of what knowledge to protect. It follows 
that the spillover gains to locating in the key centres of innovation and participating in the 
key networks are at their highest during such moments, whether for overseas entrants or 
domestic incumbents.  In this context, the monopolisation of IPRs may also make one form 
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of internationalisation more preferable to the other.  In the 1930s when free licensing of 
penicillin technologies was the industry convention, strategic alliances may have been 
enough for technology transfer and there may have been an acceptance of the unintended 
spillovers.  However, monopolisation of IPR in the presence of possible spillovers makes 
the significance of ownership of residual rights even more important and thus might favour 
full ownership.   
 
6. Conclusions  
 
No two periods in history are ever completely alike, but this detailed comparison of the 
variety of strategies adopted by U.S. firms in the 1930s and 1940s with Indian firms more 
recently does find some supporting evidence for the view that technologically laggard firms 
(in the US and in India) may attempt to overcome initial disadvantages and develop 
knowledge capabilities through targeted internationalisation strategies.  Far from exploiting 
firm specific advantages, we show that laggard firms from both countries entered growing 
markets and through their internationalisation strategies built lasting competitive 
advantages.  In fact almost all of the U.S. firms that were able to create successful 
pharmaceuticals capabilities in the 1940s, had also exploited a variety of 
internationalisation strategies to acquire relevant expertise during the late 1930s and early 
1940s, suggesting that there may be considerable merit in the more aggressive 
internationalisation strategies adopted by the Indian generics producers today.  
 
This finding has two important implications.  Firm Specific Advantages are believed to be 
the cause of outward FDI in a large literature- we show outward FDI can sometimes secure 
FSA.  Partly this is because of a long held belief that firms would not incur the manifold 
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costs of going abroad unless there was some inherent firm specific advantage that they 
could gain. However, in this paper we show that U.S. firms in the 1930s-40s and Indian 
firms from 1990 to 2005 did go abroad without many firm specific assets or advantages. 
Furthermore, among both groups some firms were able to use their internationalisation as a 
strategy to gain and develop capabilities that would sustain their competitive advantage in 
the longer term.  The particular form of internationalisation strategies that firms may resort 
to in order to gain long term competitive advantage are not well understood and may 
depend upon on several contextual features viz. nature of  IPR regimes, globalisation of 
financial markets and the particular policy regimes in place.  But it may also be the case 
that acquisitions are evidence of a party’s relative weakness and evidence of it 
compensating for its exclusion from alliances with stronger partners in the sector. 
 
Clearly much more research remains to be done, but our study also has implications for a 
broader understanding of the strategies important in technological leapfrogging.  In 
discussions of technological leapfrogging and capability building  openness to trade and 
inward FDI are privileged as the vehicles of technological transfer, but our analysis of the 
strategies used by firms in two different historical periods shows that outward FDI can be 
useful as well.  This may have implications for the host countries that receive such FDI, but 
our analysis has shown that it is not without historical precedent in technology intensive 
sectors such as pharmaceuticals. 
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Appendix Tables 
Table A1: Inward Direct Investment in the UK Pharmaceuticals Industry, 1919-1959 
A. 1919-1940 
 Parent  Entry Home Purpose Mode Notes/ Entry product 
1 Lehn & Fink 1920 US OTC G antiseptic (Lysol) & cosmetics 
2 Colgate-Palmolive 1922 US OTC G? toothpaste, soap 
3 Kolynos 1922 US OTC G toothpaste 
4 United Drug 1923 US OTC A toilet goods & proprietary medicines, acquired Boots. Divested 1933. 
5 Mentholatum 1924 US OTC G toothpaste 
6 American Home Products 1927 US OTC A toilet goods, toothpaste  
7 Rhone Poulenc 1927 F P A Acq. May & Baker c.£½m. Fine chemicals, biologicals & early sulfas. 
8 Aspro Nicholas 1927 AUS OTC G Novel aspirin, factory in Slough, expanded thru A into toiletries. P post WW2
9 Mulford 1928 US P G Late entry into UK biologicals. Parent acq by Sharp & Dohme 1929 
10 Ex Lax 1932 US OTC G Laxatives 
11 Lambert 1932 US OTC G Listerine antiseptic, toothpaste, shaving cream 
12 Warner 1932 US OTC G toilet goods, cosmetics 
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13 Pepsodent 1932 US OTC ? toothpaste 
14 Ponds 1933 US OTC G Ponds Extract ‘pain destroying and healing’. 
15 Bristol-Myers 1933 US OTC JV Laxative & toothpaste, maf by Boots after United Drug divestment. 1939 fdi.
16 CIBA 1934 CH P G+ Fine chemicals, following earlier fdi in chemicals (1911) & R&D (1919) 
17 Abbott Laboratories 1937 US P G Anaesthetics 
18 Tangee 1938 US OTC A Lipstick. 
19 Gelatin Products 1938 US P G Gelatin capsules for pills. 
20 Tampax 1938 US OTC/P G surgical tampons as minor sideline  
21 Eli Lilly 1939 US P G Antibiotics – entry at instigation of HMG 
22 Geigy 1940 CH P G+ fine chemicals following earlier fdi in chemicals 
23 Organon 1940 NL P G+ hormones following earlier fdi in Anglo-Dutch group. 
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B. 1945 - 1959 
 Parent  Entry Home Purpose Mode Notes/ Entry product 
1 American Cyanamid 1945 US P G+ Antibiotics from Lederle division, followed earlier fdi in chemicals.  
2 Miles Laboratories 1947 US OTC G Alka Seltzer & sedatives. Expanded via acquisition into dental products. 
3 Roussel Laboratories 1948 F P   
4 Squibb 1949 US P G Antibiotics, HMG invited to acquire (ex Distiller’s) factory in Liverpool 
5 Johnson & Johnson 1949 US P G+ Surgical dressings, following earlier fdi in baby products (1928) 
6 Foster McLellan 1950 US OTC G medicinal products 
7 Riker Laboratories 1951 US P ? pharmaceutical chemicals 
8 Upjohn 1952 US P JV Entered JV with Boots to manufacture antibiotics. 
9 Vicks 1952 US OTC G Vicks Vapo-Rub salve. 
10 SB Penick 1952 US OTC/P ? Medicinal products (spermicide) and fine chemicals. 
11 Pfizer 1952 US P G Penicillin 
12 Armour Pharmaceuticals 1954 US P G+ Hormones, followed earlier fdi in food and chemicals 
13 Stafford Miller 1955 US OTC ? Dental fixatives 
14 Smith Kline 1956 US P A Fine chemicals & sulphas 
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15 TIC Gums 1957 US P G Supplier for pill manufacturing 
16 Merck 1957 US P A+ A Sharp & Dohme in 1953. A Thos Morsons 1957 fine chem. - sulphas  
17 Wizard Lightfoot 1959 US OTC  Corn pads, arch supports etc.  
 
Notes: Parent is parent company name. Entry is year of entry into UK manufacturing (unless otherwise stated); this typically post-dated UK sales agencies. Purpose 
differentiates between ‘P’ for prescription medicines or specialised inputs, or ‘OTC’ for non-prescription medicines, toilet goods, cosmetics and so on. Mode of Entry is 
Greenfield (‘G’), Acquisition (‘A’), or Joint Venture (‘JV’). Exit is year of divestment. Genuine withdrawals only recorded. Change of parent company within same 
country not recorded (e.g. Chas. Phillips acquired by United Drug in 1923, but UK subsidiary continued nevertheless). Exits within period recorded only.  
The suffix ‘+’ indicates an earlier entry in a non-pharmaceutical sector, thus CIBA entered UK manufacturing with a chemicals plant in 1911, but pharmaceuticals only in 
1934 (listed below as G+). Notes mostly state the leading product for the UK market, or elaborate on the main purpose for entry. 
 
Source: Database on historic FDI into UK manufacturing, retailing and banking. See Bostock and Jones (1994), Jones and Bostock (1996), Fletcher and Godley (2000), 
Godley and Fletcher (2001) and Godley (2003). Supplemented by additional research by author (see Godley and Leslie-Hughes 2007). 
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TableA2: Acquisitions by Indian Pharma firms: 1995-2006 
 
Month Year Acquirer Indian Company Acquired Company Amount ($ 
MILLION) 
Headquarter 
September 1995 Ranbaxy Laboratories Ohm Labs  USA 
 1997 Sun Pharmaceuticals Stake of 30 % in Caraco Pharm Labs 8 USA 
March 1998 Wockhardt Ltd Wallis Laboratory 9 UK 
April 2000 Ranbaxy Laboratories Basics, Germany-based generic company of Bayer AG 8 Germany 
December 2001 Aurobindo Pharma Limited 60  per cent stake in Shanghai Wide Tex Chemical Co Limited  China 
June 2002 Ranbaxy Laboratories A brand called Veratide from Procter & Gamble Pharmaceuticals 5 Germany 
September 2002 Ranbaxy Laboratories 10 per cent equity stake in Nihon Pharmaceutical Industry Co Ltd  Japan 
March 2002 Dr Reddy's Laboratories Ltd BMS Laboratories Ltd and Meridian Healthcare (UK) Ltd 13 UK 
April 2002 Unichem Niche Generics 5 UK 
July 2002 Ranbaxy Laboratories Liquid manufacturing facility from the New York-based Signature Pharmaceuticals Inc USA 
October 2002 Sun Pharmaceutical Additional stake of 4 per cent in Caraco Pharmaceutical  USA 
April 2003 Aurobindo Pharma Limited The entire 50 per cent stake of Shanxi Tongling Pharmaceuticals Company 4 China 
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Ltd (STPCL) in a Chinese joint venture 
July 2003 Zydus Cadila The formulation business of Alpharma France 6 France 
December 2003 Ranbaxy Laboratories RPG (Aventis) SA and its subsidiary OPIH SARL 86 France 
July 2003 Wockhardt Ltd CP Pharmaceuticals Ltd 18 UK 
May 2003 Suven Pharmaceuticals Ltd The assets of the New Jersey-based Synthon Chiragenics Corporation  USA 
June 2004 Jubilant Organosys Ltd 80 per cent stake in two Belgium-based pharmaceutical companies - 
Pharmaceutical Services Incorporated NV and PSI Supply NV 
16 Belgium 
April 2004 Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Laboratorios Klinger 5 Brazil 
May 2004 Wockhardt Ltd Esparma Gmbh 11 Germany 
August 2004 Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Two FDA approved products from Clonmel Healthcare Ltd  Ireland 
December 2004 Nicholas Piramal India Ltd The global inhalation anaesthetics (IA) business of Rhodia Organique Fine 
Ltd 
14 UK 
May 2004 Dr Reddy's Laboratories Ltd Trigenesis Therapeutics Inc 11 USA 
September 2004 Sun Pharmaceutical Three brands from US-based Women's First Healthcare 5 USA 
October 2005 Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Servycal SA  Argentina 
June 2005 Matrix Laboratories Ltd Docpharma NV 263 Belgium 
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February 2005 Stides Arcolab Additional stake of 12.5% in Strides Latina 6 Brazil 
March 2005 Glenmark Pharmaceuticals The hormonal brand, Uno-Ciclo, from Instituto Biochimico Indústria 
Farmacêutica Ltda 
5 Brazil 
July 2005 Nicholas Piramal India Ltd 17 per cent stake in BioSyntech, Inc. 7 Canada 
September 2005 Matrix Laboratories Ltd 60 per cent stake in the Mchem group  China 
June 2005 Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd Heumann Pharma GmbH & Co Generica KG 30 Germany 
August 2005 Sun Pharmaceutical Valeant Pharma's manufacturing operations 10 Hungary 
July 2005 Stides Arcolab 70 per cent stake in Beltapharm 2 Italy 
November 2005 Dr Reddy's Laboratories Ltd Roche's API unit 59 Mexico 
July 2005 Stides Arcolab A sterile manufacturing facility 8 Poland 
December 2005 Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Bouwer Barlett  South Africa 
June 2005 Ranbaxy Laboratories Efarmes Sa 18 Spain 
April 2005 Dishman Pharmaceuticals & 
Chemicals Ltd 
Synprotec Ltd 4 UK 
October 2005 Nicholas Piramal India Ltd Avecia Pharmaceuticals 17 UK 
July 2005 Jubilant Organosys Ltd Trinity Labs 12 USA 
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November 2005 Sun Pharmaceutical Able Labs 23 USA 
May 2005 Malladi Drugs and PharmaceuticalsNovus Fine Chemicals 23 USA 
July 2005 Jubilant Organosys Ltd 64 per cent equity in Trinity Laboratories Inc and its subsidiary Trigen 
Laboratories Inc 
12 USA 
October 2005 Jubilant Organosys Ltd Target Research Associates Inc 34 USA 
June 2005 Stides Arcolab 60 per cent stake in Biopharma 1 Venezuela 
March 2006 Marksans Pharma Ltd Majority stake in Nova Pharmaceuticals  Australia 
February 2006 Dr Reddy's Laboratories Ltd Betapharm Arzneimittel GmbH 582 Germany 
February 2006 Kemwell Pvt Ltd Fizer's manufacturing plant in Sweden  Sweden 
February 2006 Dishman Pharmaceuticals & 
Chemicals Ltd 
51 per cent in IO3S Ltd  Switzerland 
February 2006 Aurobindo Pharma Limited Milpharm Ltd  UK 
February 2006 Natco Pharma Ltd NICK's Drug Store  USA 
March 2006 Ranbaxy Laboratories Patents, trademarks and equipmennt of Senetek's autoinjector business  USA 
March 2006 Ranbaxy Laboratories The unbranded generic business of Allen SpA, a division of GlaxoSmithKline Italy 
Source: Pradhan, JP and  Alakshendra A (2006) "Overseas Acquisition versus Greenfield Foreign Investment: Which Internationalization Strategy is better for Indian 
Pharmaceutical Enterprises?”, ISID Working Paper, No. WP2006/07.
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Notes: 
                                               
1
 Pisano (1996) has pointed out that biotechnology process development does not have as rich a 
theoretical and empirical knowledge base as traditional chemistry-based pharmaceutical process 
development has. Even the most experienced bioprocess firms have a limited knowledge base to draw 
on.  Thus, the biotech revolution may have made new entry easier and less dependent on existing patent 
holdings.   
2
 For example the Htach-Waxman Act passed in 1985 in the USA. 
3
 There was of course some overlap. Both Merck and Powers, Weightman and Rosengarten were 
subsidiaries of German producers, yet before 1914 had begun to experiment with novel products. 
4
 The term ethical pharmaceuticals derives from the strategy of promoting products only to physicians 
and pharmacists and not direct to the public. The terms ethical and prescription are used 
interchangeably here. 
5
 Hence the frequent references to laboratories in the advertising copy of the early US OTC firms were 
(perhaps confusingly to a present-day perspective) actually attempts to confer greater legitimacy on 
their shaving cream or toothpaste etc products.  
6
 There was only one non-U.S. entrant – the French firm Roussell Laboratories – in the post-war 
population, compared with five in the inter-war period – Rhone Poulenc (F), Aspro Nicholas (AUS), 
CIBA (CH), Geigy (CH) and Organon (NL). 
7
 The convention had been that licensees produced unlimited quantities of patented products, paying a 
standard 2½% royalty fee to the patent holder. 
8
 Some of which later were to merge with the major pharmaceuticals firms (Chandler 2005). 
9
 Space constraints do not permit similarly detailed discussion of Upjohn, Lederle, Sharp and Dohme 
and others. But all exploited international links to acquire key knowledge. See Godley 2000. 
10
 For more details see Athreye,  Kale and Ramani (2008), Table 1. The small scale sector in 
pharmaceuticals was also actively encouraged. 
11
 R&D as a proportion of sales was about 2% for Ranbaxy in the 1990s – modest by world standards 
but quite large by Indian standards.  
12
 Under this new law, manufacturers no longer had to go through a lengthy period of extensive clinical 
trials in order to market a generic drug - demonstration of bio-equivalence was sufficient to acquire 
marketing rights on the drug. Procedures were established for the resolution of disputes between 
branded drug manufacturers and generic manufacturers. 
13
 Developed countries accounted for 50 of 142 projects (35%) with the most popular destinations 
being (# of FDI projects in parentheses): USA (18), Nepal (13), UK (12), Uzbekistan (9), Mauritius (8), 
Russia (6), China, Ireland, Netherlands and Thailand with 5 projects each. 
14
 Out of the 127 greenfield projects between 1990-99, for which they have information on the nature 
of ownership, 64 are jointly owned and 63 are wholly-owned subsidiaries. Further, about 58 of these 
projects were for trading and marketing, whilst 53 were for manufacturing and 8 are for both 
manufacturing and trading. 
15
 Appendix Table A2 lists the 52 acquisitions made by Indian companies in the 1995-2006 period.   
16
 See Appendix Table A2 for this. 
17
 See Pradhan and Alakshendra (2006), Table 13 for details. 
18
 For more details based on case study evidence, see Kale et al (2006). 
19
 Numbers from USPTO website updated to October 30, 2007. 
20
 These estimates are based on research reported by Silico Research at the URL: http://jungle-
research.com/analysis/emerging/briefing/biotechasia. [last downloaded 29 October 2007) 
